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Practical Consequences, Institutional
Competence, and the Kentucky Bond
Case
by Bradley W. Joondeph
Introduction
On November 5 the U.S. Supreme Court will hear
arguments in Department of Revenue of the Com-
monwealth of Kentucky v. Davis,1 one of the most
anticipated dormant commerce clause cases to come
before the Court in several years. At issue is
whether states can provide tax preferences for the
interest earned on their own municipal bonds. Like
more than 40 other states, Kentucky exempts the
interest earned on Kentucky municipal bonds —
bonds issued by the state and its various political
subdivisions — from state personal income taxation,
but it denies that exemption to municipal bonds
issued by other states and their political subdivi-
sions. The question presented in Davis is whether
this preference for in-state municipal bonds imper-
missibly discriminates against interstate commerce.
As a doctrinal matter, the case largely turns on
how the Court construes its decision from its last
term in United Haulers Assn., Inc. v. Oneida-
Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth.2 In United
Haulers, the Court upheld two New York county
‘‘flow control’’ ordinances that required all solid
waste in the counties to be processed at designated,
municipally owned facilities, even though the
ordinances plainly disadvantaged interstate com-
merce. Critically, the Court held that state laws
that ‘‘favor the government,’’ that ‘‘treat every
private business, whether in-state or out-of-state,
exactly the same,’’ and that concern ‘‘a traditional
government activity . . . do not discriminate against
interstate commerce for purposes of the Commerce
Clause.’’3 State income tax preferences for in-state
municipal bond interest seem to meet all three of
those criteria. Thus, United Haulers provides a
straightforward doctrinal basis for the Court to
uphold tax exemptions like Kentucky’s.
In many respects, though, the most interesting
aspects of Davis lie outside its formal legal logics.
Indeed, the case raises some fundamental questions
about the role of practical consequences in judicial
decision-making and the comparative institutional
competencies of Congress and the Supreme Court.
If the Court invalidated Kentucky’s tax exemp-
tion in Davis, it would mark a sea change in the
state taxation of municipal bonds. States have pro-
vided tax preferences for their own municipal bonds
since the advent of state personal income taxes in
the early 1900s. And the Kentucky Court of Appeals
decision in this case — the judgment now under
review — was the first in U.S. history to hold such a
preference unconstitutional. Given that history, as
well as Congress’s long-standing acquiescence in the
practice, state governments have made substantial
financial commitments on the understanding that
those exemptions were constitutional. A decision by
the Court to prohibit them would catch the states
1Docket No. 06-666, cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 2451 (2007).
(For coverage of the Kentucky Court of Appeal’s decision, see
State Tax Notes, Jan. 16, 2006, p. 108, Doc 2006-627, or 2006
STT 8-22.)
2127 S. Ct. 1786 (2007).
3Id. at 1790.
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over a barrel, forcing state governments to shoulder
billions of dollars in losses transitioning to a system
in which all municipal bonds must be taxed equally.
Importantly, the reason states would face those
transition costs is that the Court’s decision would
apply retroactively. Regardless of how states decided
to tax municipal bonds issued in the future, the
Court’s decision would force the states to incur large
refund liabilities for taxes recently paid on out-of-
state municipal bonds and to forgo taxing the inter-
est on most out-of-state municipal bonds that have
already been issued. As a result, state governments
would be required to disgorge or forgo many billions
of dollars in tax revenue. And they would incur those
losses precisely because of their reliance on a status
quo that, until January 2006, no one had much
reason to question.
Davis v. Kentucky raises some
fundamental questions about the
role of practical consequences in
judicial decision-making and the
comparative institutional
competencies of Congress and the
Supreme Court.
Unlike the Court, Congress could completely
avoid those transition costs. That is, if taxing in-
state and out-of-state municipal bonds equally is
indeed the best policy for interstate commerce, Con-
gress could draft a purely prospective remedy that
applied solely to municipal bonds that have not yet
been issued. Thus, no matter what one thinks of
United Haulers and existing dormant commerce
clause doctrine, there are strong pragmatic reasons
for the Court to ratify the status quo and uphold
state tax preferences for in-state municipal bonds.
As it has done in several other important state tax
cases — such as Moorman Mnfg. v. Bair,4 Common-
wealth Edison v. Montana,5 and Quill v. North
Dakota6 — the Court would be well advised to
recognize the superior institutional competence of
Congress in sorting out the details of a complicated
economic question with huge fiscal ramifications.
I. Background
Like almost every state that imposes a personal
income tax, Kentucky begins its calculation of per-
sonal income with a definition borrowed from the
Internal Revenue Code.7 Kentucky law then man-
dates several adjustments, one of which concerns
the interest earned on out-of-state municipal bonds:
All taxpayers must ‘‘include interest income derived
from obligations of sister states and political subdi-
visions thereof.’’8 There is no similar provision for
the inclusion of interest earned on municipal bonds
issued by Kentucky or its political subdivisions.
Thus, Kentucky law operates to tax the income
earned on out-of-state municipal bonds while ex-
empting the interest earned on in-state bonds.
George and Catherine Davis are Kentucky citi-
zens who own shares in mutual funds that include
municipal bonds issued by states other than Ken-
tucky. The Davises thus earned interest on out-of-
state municipal bonds, for which they were required
to pay Kentucky personal income tax. In April 2003
they filed a class-action complaint in Jefferson
County Circuit Court representing all persons pay-
ing Kentucky income taxes on interest from munici-
pal bonds issued by other states or municipalities.
The Davises argued that Kentucky’s unequal treat-
ment of the income derived from in-state and out-of-
state municipal bonds discriminated against inter-
state commerce and thus violated the dormant
commerce clause.9 They sought a declaratory judg-
ment, an injunction, and tax refunds.
The Kentucky trial court granted the Kentucky
DOR’s motion for summary judgment. The court
held that Kentucky’s tax exemption for in-state
municipal bond interest did not violate the dormant
commerce clause because the state was effectively
acting as a ‘‘market participant.’’ It is well estab-
lished in Supreme Court precedent that when a
state or local government acts as a participant in the
relevant market — as a buyer or seller, rather than
as a regulator — its actions are exempt from dor-
mant commerce clause scrutiny.10 The dormant com-
merce clause restricts only states’ capacity to regu-
late, and the trial court found that Kentucky’s
actions here did not amount to regulation: ‘‘Consid-
ering the entire transaction, the tax exemption
granted to resident purchasers of municipal bonds
qualifies under those doctrines which permit bur-
dens on interstate commerce in certain limited con-
texts and is, therefore, not the type of burden with
which the commerce clause is concerned.’’11
4437 U.S. 267 (1978).
5453 U.S. 609 (1981).
6504 U.S. 298 (1992).
7Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. section 141.010(9).
8Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. section 141.010(10)(c).
9They also contended that Kentucky’s tax preference for
in-state bonds violated the equal protection clause of the 14th
Amendment and similar provisions contained in sections 3
and 59 of the Kentucky Constitution. These claims are not
before the Supreme Court.
10See, e.g., White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr.
Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447
U.S. 429 (1980); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap. Corp., 429 U.S.
794 (1976).
11The trial court also ruled against the Davises on a
procedural matter, holding that they lacked standing to
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The Davises appealed, and in an opinion written
by Judge John D. Minton Jr. — who has since been
elevated to the Kentucky Supreme Court — the
Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed.12 First, the
court reasoned that ‘‘Kentucky’s bond taxation sys-
tem is facially unconstitutional as it obviously af-
fords more favorable taxation treatment to in-state
bonds than it does to extraterritorially issued
bonds.’’13 The exemption was therefore permissible
only if it fell within one of the recognized exceptions
to the dormant commerce clause. The only exception
that might have applied was the market participant
doctrine, and unlike the trial court, the court of
appeals concluded Kentucky’s actions amounted to
more than market participation. Although the state
‘‘acts as a market participant when it issues bonds,’’
the tax preference was enforced under its taxing
power. And ‘‘‘when a state chooses to tax its citizens,
it is acting as a market regulator[,]’ not as a market
participant.’’14
The Kentucky DOR then filed a motion for discre-
tionary review at the Kentucky Supreme Court.
Puzzlingly, that court denied the motion. There were
several reasons for the Kentucky Supreme Court to
grant review. First, the court of appeals decision was
the first in U.S. history to hold that a state’s tax
preference for its own municipal bonds — a practice
that was at least 80 years old and perhaps much
older — violated the dormant commerce clause.
Second, the decision had huge fiscal ramifications
for Kentucky, because of both the state’s potentially
large refund liability and its likely need to exempt
future out-of-state municipal bond interest from
income. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the
decision left Kentucky at a significant competitive
disadvantage in the municipal bond market. While
the other states with personal income taxes could
continue to offer tax exemptions to their residents
for in-state bonds, Kentucky was barred from doing
the same. That meant Kentucky bonds were com-
paratively unattractive to the residents of the more
than 40 other states with tax preferences for in-state
bonds, but they were no more attractive than any
other state’s bonds to Kentucky residents. It was the
worst of all worlds. Yet on August 17, 2006, the
Kentucky Supreme Court denied review.
Kentucky then sought a writ of certiorari at the
U.S. Supreme Court, at which point the timing of
events became interesting.15 Kentucky filed its pe-
tition on November 9, 2006. The Davises initially
waived their right to file a brief in opposition to
certiorari, but in mid-December the Court called for
a response. (The Court will not grant certiorari until
they have received a brief in opposition.) The
Davises then filed their opposition brief on January
15, 2007,16 and the justices scheduledDavis for their
February 16 conference. Once a petition is scheduled
for discussion at conference, the Court typically
grants or denies review. On February 16, however,
the Court took no action. The reason is that the
justices had heard argument in United Haulers on
January 8, and they recognized that the outcome in
United Haulers might well affect the appropriate
disposition of Davis. The Court therefore deferred
consideration of the petition until it had handed
down United Haulers.17
The Court would be well advised
to recognize the superior
institutional competence of
Congress in sorting out the details
of a complicated economic
question with huge fiscal
ramifications.
United Haulers came down on April 30, and the
Court then scheduledDavis for discussion at its next
conference, on May 10. After holding a certiorari
petition pending another decision, the Court usually
either ‘‘GVRs’’ the case — grants the petition, va-
cates the judgment below, and remands the matter
for reconsideration in light of the recent decision —
or it simply denies review. The Court GVRs when it
believes the recent decision could cause the lower
court to reach a different decision; otherwise, it
denies certiorari. In Davis, though, the Court did
pursue their claims on behalf of any ‘‘non-individual’’ tax-
payers — corporations, estates, trusts, and fiduciaries.
12Davis v. Department of Rev. of Finance and Admin.
Cabinet, 197 S.W.3d 557 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006), cert. granted, 127
S. Ct. 2451 (2007).
13Id. at 562.
14Id. at 564 (quoting Sharper v. Tracy, 647 N.E.2d 550, 552
(Ohio Ct. App. 1994)). On the procedural issue, the court of
appeals held that the trial court had confused the issue of
standing with that of class certification, a matter that should
not have been addressed until the Davises filed their motion
for class certification. See id. at 565-66. That is not a part of
the question presented at the Supreme Court, but it will be
addressed by the trial court on remand if the Davises prevail.
15Details about the Supreme Court’s handling of Ken-
tucky’s petition for certiorari are available on the Court’s
docket sheet. See http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/06-
666.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2007).
16By this point, the Davises had retained the counsel of
David J. Guin of Donaldson & Guin in Birmingham, Ala.
Donaldson & Guin is pursuing similar claims in several other
states that permit class actions for tax refunds. It is also
soliciting plaintiffs to ‘‘pursue individual refunds for trusts
and high-wealth individuals in states that do not permit class
actions.’’ See http://www.dglawfirm.com/municipalbondtax
.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2007).
17The Court refers to that procedure as ‘‘holding’’ the
petition pending the outcome of the argued case.
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neither. First, at its May 10 conference, the justices
were unable to decide how to dispose of the petition,
and they relisted Davis for their next conference. A
week later, that indecision was gone. At least four
justices concluded that the Court should hear the
case on the merits, and the Court granted review. It
has since scheduled the case for oral argument
November 5.
II. United Haulers and Dormant Commerce
Clause Doctrine
Timing can be quite important in life. And in the
case of state tax exemptions for in-state municipal
bond interest, the timing of Davis — coming to the
Supreme Court only months afterUnited Haulers—
may prove crucial.
Before United Haulers, Kentucky had two basic
arguments to defend its unequal taxation of in-state
and out-of-state municipal bonds. First, it could
argue that the Supreme Court had effectively up-
held such tax preferences in its 1881 decision of
Bonaparte v. Tax Court.18 At issue in Bonaparte was
Maryland’s attempt to impose a property tax on
out-of-state municipal bonds owned by a Maryland
resident. The taxpayer argued that Maryland had
violated the full faith and credit clause because the
states issuing the bonds had exempted them from
their own state property taxes. In a terse, five-
paragraph opinion, the Court rejected the taxpayer’s
claim: ‘‘We know of no provision of the Constitution
of the United States which prohibits such taxa-
tion.’’19
Kentucky might contend — indeed, it has con-
tended in its briefs to this point — that Bonaparte
stands for the proposition that states have the
constitutional authority to tax other states’ munici-
pal bonds however they choose, regardless of how
they tax their own municipal bonds. But that argu-
ment seems to misunderstand Bonaparte. At bot-
tom, the issue in Bonaparte was jurisdictional. The
question presented was whether states could effec-
tively immunize their municipal bonds from taxa-
tion by other states. The Court rejected that idea,
explaining that upholding such a power would allow
the states to legislate extraterritorially. As the Court
said in the opinion’s critical passage, ‘‘No State can
legislate except with reference to its own jurisdic-
tion. One State cannot exempt property from taxa-
tion in another.’’20 Bonaparte therefore stands for
the uncontroversial proposition that State A has the
jurisdiction to tax its own residents on the property
or income that they derive from State B, regardless
of how that property or income is taxed by State B.
It says nothing about the quite different question
whether a state can unequally tax its own residents
on the interest they earn from in-state and out-of-
state municipal bonds.
Second, Kentucky could argue — and, again, it
has in its briefs — that by selling municipal bonds
and choosing not to tax the interest paid thereon,
the state is acting as a market participant. The
difficulty with that argument, though, is identified
by the Kentucky Court of Appeals: The unequal
treatment challenged by the taxpayers seems to
concern the way Kentucky taxes municipal bonds,
not the way it sells them. And because there is no
private market in taxation, imposing a tax (or pro-
viding a tax exemption) cannot qualify as market
participation. Conceivably, one could view Ken-
tucky’s sale and taxation of its own bonds as a single
sales transaction, with the pledge to forgo taxing the
interest on the bonds as a term that runs with the
bond’s purchase. But that’s not the only way to see
the transaction, and it may not be the most intui-
tive.
In any event, before the Court’s decision inUnited
Haulers, Kentucky’s legal position was something
short of airtight. But United Haulers fundamentally
altered the legal landscape — so much so that
Kentucky now holds the upper hand.
Again, at issue in United Haulers was whether
two flow- control ordinances adopted by Oneida and
Herkimer counties in upstate New York violated the
dormant commerce clause. The ordinances required
that all trash in the counties be delivered to desig-
nated, municipally owned waste facilities for pro-
cessing. A coalition of waste haulers contended that
the ordinances discriminated against interstate
commerce because they prohibited the haulers from
delivering trash to out-of-state processing facilities
at substantially lower cost.21 And the waste haulers
had a fairly strong argument: The Court had invali-
dated a nearly identical ordinance only 13 years
earlier in C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown.22 As
Chief Justice John Roberts acknowledged in his
opinion for the Court in United Haulers, the ‘‘only
salient difference’’ between the two cases was that
the favored facility in Carbone was privately owned
(at least in name), whereas the favored facilities in
United Haulers were owned and operated by local
government.23
But that sole difference was ‘‘constitutionally sig-
nificant’’ — indeed, dispositive.24 The Court ex-
plained that there are several ‘‘compelling reasons’’
to treat laws that benefit the government differently
from those that benefit in-state private businesses
18104 U.S. 592 (1881).
19Id. at 594.
20Id.
21United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1792.
22511 U.S. 383 (1994).
23United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1790.
24Id.
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under the dormant commerce clause.25 First, unlike
private businesses, ‘‘government is vested with the
responsibility of protecting the health, safety, and
welfare of its citizens.’’26 Laws favoring state and
local governments therefore ‘‘may be directed to-
ward any number of legitimate goals unrelated to
protectionism.’’27 Second, treating public and pri-
vate entities alike for purposes of the dormant
commerce clause ‘‘would lead to unprecedented and
unbounded interference by the courts with state and
local government.’’28 Though the commerce clause
plays an important role in preventing state and local
governments from engaging in economic protection-
ism, it ‘‘is not a roving license for federal courts to
decide what activities are appropriate for state and
local government to undertake.’’29 Finally, courts
should be ‘‘particularly hesitant to interfere with
[government] efforts under the guise of the com-
merce clause’’ when the activities in question are
‘‘both typically and traditionally a local government
function.’’30
The basic rule of United Haulers is succinct:
‘‘Laws that favor the government’’ in areas of ‘‘tra-
ditional government activity,’’ but which ‘‘treat every
private business, whether in-state or out-of-state,
exactly the same,’’ ‘‘do not discriminate against in-
terstate commerce for purposes of the commerce
clause.’’31 That rule seems to dictate that a state’s
tax preference for the interest earned on its own
municipal bonds does not discriminate against in-
terstate commerce, and is therefore constitutional.
United Haulers fundamentally
altered the legal landscape — so
much so that Kentucky now holds
the upper hand.
First, tax preferences like Kentucky’s favor state
governments and their political subdivisions, not
private business interests. Because of those exemp-
tions, taxpayers are willing to accept a lower pretax
rate of return on in-state municipal bonds. That
means a state and its political subdivisions can issue
their bonds at a considerably lower interest rate
than the market would otherwise require. Thus, the
beneficiaries of those exemptions are generally not
the bondholders (though they certainly capture a
portion of the benefit, at least in some states32); the
market largely accounts for their favorable tax
treatment by reducing their yield on the tax-
preferred bonds.33 The principal beneficiaries are
the states and their political subdivisions, which are
able to borrow at a considerably lower interest rate,
reducing their costs in raising capital. Of course, it is
quite possible that those exemptions actually cost
the states more in forgone income tax revenue than
they deliver in reduced borrowing costs.34 But it was
likewise possible in United Haulers that the addi-
tional costs inherent in creating a government-run
monopoly for waste disposal in Oneida and
Herkimer counties more than offset the benefits to
the counties’ citizens. The relevant point for pur-
poses ofUnited Haulers is that, to the extent the law
at issue creates a preference, the preference favors a
government entity.
Second, tax preferences like Kentucky’s treat all
private business interests identically. There was no
advantage for any in-state businesses — whether
they are bond issuers, bond dealers, bond brokers, or
bondholders — over their out-of-state competitors.
To be sure, those preferences plainly create a finan-
cial incentive for a state’s citizens, when they are
purchasing municipal bonds, to purchase their home
state’s bonds rather than those issued by another
state. As a result, the proportion of investors holding
a given state’s municipal bonds who are citizens of
that state is substantially greater than it would be
absent the preferences.35 That explains the exist-
ence of the roughly 640 state-specific mutual funds
that various investment companies now market to
investors.36 But whatever one thinks of that impact
on interstate commerce, the benefit is enjoyed by
state governments and their municipalities, not by
private businesses.
25Id. at 1795.
26Id. (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts,
471 U.S. 724, 756 (1985)).
27Id. at 1796.
28Id.
29Id.
30Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
31Id. at 1790.
32See Brian D. Galle and Ethan Yale, ‘‘Can Discriminatory
State Taxation of Municipal Bonds Be Justified? Thoughts on
the Davis Topside Briefs,’’ p. 229 of this issue.
33See C. Steven Cole, Pu Liu, and Stanley D. Smith, ‘‘The
Capitalization of the State Tax Exemption Benefit in Munici-
pal Bond Yields,’’ 7 J. Fin. & Strategic Decisions 67, 68 (1994),
available at http://www.studyfinance.com/jfsd/pdffiles/v7n2/
cole.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2007) (finding 100 percent
capitalization of the state tax exemption benefit in the yield of
municipal bonds).
34See id. at 68, 72.
35The strength of that incentive turns on the taxpayer’s
marginal state income tax rate. The effect is apt to be
strongest for bonds issued by states like California, where the
top marginal income tax rate is 9.3 percent, while it less
significant for bonds issued by states like Connecticut, where
the top marginal rate is 5 percent.
36According to a recent study, as of May 31, 2007, there
were 642 different single-state municipal bond mutual funds,
with assets totaling $192.2 billion. See Brief of Churchill Tax-
Free Fund of Kentucky et al., Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 11, DOR v. Davis (No. 06-666).
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Finally, the act of borrowing money to finance the
construction of infrastructure and other public im-
provements certainly seems like a ‘‘traditional gov-
ernment activity.’’ Of course, the concept of tradi-
tional governmental functions has a checkered past
at the Supreme Court. In two separate lines of cases,
the Court has previously attempted to apply a
similar standard only to abandon it as unmanage-
able.37 The more recent episode began in 1976 with
the Court’s decision in National League of Cities v.
Usery,38 which held that Congress may not use its
commerce power to ‘‘displace the States’ freedom to
structure integral operations in areas of traditional
governmental functions.’’39 The Court thus invali-
dated the minimum wage and maximum-hour pro-
visions of the Fair Labor Standards Act to the extent
they displaced state control over employer-employee
relationships in areas such as fire prevention, police
protection, sanitation, and public health. But in a
series of subsequent decisions attempting to apply
National League of Cities, the Court struggled to
define those functions as immune from federal regu-
lation.40 Hence, only nine years later, in Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth.,41 the Court
gave up the effort, concluding that the ‘‘traditional
governmental function’’ standard was ‘‘unsound in
principle and unworkable in practice.’’42 Thus, there
is reason to wonder how important the ‘‘traditional
governmental activity’’ criterion was to the Court’s
decision in United Haulers and how long it will
remain a part of the Court’s doctrine. For now,
though, it is plainly an element of the governing
rule, and therefore an issue that Kentucky must
address.
Fortunately for the states, that should not be a
problem. First, the practice of issuing municipal
debt has deep historical roots, predating the issu-
ance of corporate debt by several centuries.43 Ameri-
can cities incurred debt as early as the 17th cen-
tury.44 New York City issued the first officially
recorded municipal bond in 1812 to finance the
construction of the Erie Canal.45 By 1843, U.S. cities
had accumulated approximately $25 million in out-
standing debt, and the number of municipal bond
issues has grown exponentially ever since.46 State
and local governments issued $26 billion in munici-
pal bonds in 1975, and they issued more than 10
times that amount ($263.8 billion) in 1999.47 The
value of outstanding U.S. municipal bonds is now
roughly $2.4 trillion.48
More fundamentally, borrowing money is critical
to state and local governments’ capacity to provide
essential but costly governmental services.49 There
are approximately 87,000 state and local govern-
ments in the United States,50 and only the very
largest are capable of financing any significant capi-
tal improvements exclusively from current revenue.
Even for state governments, issuing bonds is often
37See United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1810-11 (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
38426 U.S. 833 (1976).
39Id. at 852.
40See, e.g., FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982);
Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455 U.S. 678
(1982); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recl. Assn., 452
U.S. 264 (1981).
41469 U.S. 528 (1985).
42Id. at 546.
43See Judy Wesalo Temel, The Fundamentals of Municipal
Bonds 49 (5th ed. 2001) (noting that Italian city-states
borrowed from major merchant banking families during the
Renaissance).
44See id.
45See Frank Shafroth, ‘‘Which State Taxes Are ‘Preferred’
for Infrastructure?’’State Tax Notes, Apr. 17, 2006, p. 237,Doc
2006-6560, or 2006 STT 73-4.
46See Temel, supra note 43, at 49-50.
47See id. at 3.
48See Tom Herman, ‘‘Justices to Hear Muni-Bond Case —
Kentucky Tax Fight Over Exemptions Affects Many States, ’’
The Wall Street Journal, May 22, 2007, at D3.
49Conceivably, that is less true of some kinds of private
activity bonds. Municipal bonds fall into two basic categories:
governmental bonds and private activity bonds. See Cynthia
Belmonte, ‘‘Tax-Exempt Bonds, 1996-2002,’’ at 151-52 (Statis-
tics of Income Bulletin, Summer 2005), available at http://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/02govbnd.pdf (last visited July 17,
2007). Governmental bonds have no statutory definition. See
Public Finance Network, Tax-Exempt Financing: A Primer 3.
They are generally issued to finance facilities that are owned,
controlled, and operated by state or local governments, such
as schools, streets, and utilities. See id. at 2; Belmonte, at 155.
Private activity bonds are defined by section 141 of the
Internal Revenue Code. See 26 U.S.C. section 141. In brief, a
municipal obligation will be considered a private activity
bond, ‘‘irrespective of the purpose for which it is issued or the
source of payment, if (1) more than 10 percent of the proceeds
of the issue will finance property that will be used by a
nongovernmental person in a trade or business, and (2) the
payment of debt service on more than 10 percent of the
proceeds of the issue will be (A) secured by property used in a
private trade or business or payments in respect of such
property, or (B) derived from payments in respect of property
used in a private trade or business.’’ Temel, supra note 43, at
251. Roughly three-fourths of the municipal bond market
consists of governmental bonds, and one-fourth of private
activity bonds. See Belmonte, at 151 (between 1996 and 2002
more than $1.5 trillion in governmental bonds and $548
billion in private activity bonds were issued).
50U.S. Census Bureau, ‘‘Statistical Abstract of the United
States: 2007,’’ at p. 264 (Table 415).
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the only practical means to finance the construction
of essential infrastructure, such as roads, highways,
airports, and utilities. Bond issues make those pub-
lic investments possible by allowing state and local
governments to spread the relevant tax burden over
several years.
Thus, issuing bonds functions as a temporal ex-
tension of the states’ authority to tax, a power that
lies at the core of their sovereignty. Municipal bonds
permit governments to extend the time frame of
taxation over the useful life of the capital improve-
ment rather than forcing them to impose the entire
tax burden at the time of the improvement’s con-
struction. Moreover, bonds promote fairness in pub-
lic finance by enabling state and local governments
to better ensure that the citizens who benefit from
long-term capital improvements (those who live in
the community over the life of the assets) are those
who pay for them (in taxes that go toward servicing
the debts). Absent that spreading of the tax burden,
taxpayers required to fund the entire cost of public
works at the time of their construction would have a
strong incentive to undersupply those public goods.
Issuing bonds functions as a
temporal extension of the states’
authority to tax, a power that lies
at the core of their sovereignty.
In short, a state’s income tax preference for its
own municipal bonds appears to fall squarely within
the rule announced in United Haulers: It favors the
government, provides no advantage to private busi-
nesses, and involves a traditional governmental
activity.
That is not to say that distinguishing United
Haulers from Davis would be impossible, particu-
larly if the justices were eager to cabin United
Haulers’s implications. First, one could lean on the
Court’s statement in United Haulers that ‘‘the most
palpable harm imposed by the ordinances — more
expensive trash removal — [was] likely to fall upon’’
the residents of Oneida and Herkimer counties.51
According to the Court, that meant that there was a
reliable political check in place: Those bearing the
costs of the ordinances were represented in the
political process that enacted them and that could
repeal them. In contrast, the costs of state tax
preferences for their own municipal bonds are borne
mostly outside the state — specifically, by other
state governments and their political subdivisions.
Kentucky’s tax scheme reduces the state’s borrow-
ing costs, but it increases those expenses for any
government outside Kentucky attempting to sell its
bonds to Kentucky citizens. That exportation of
costs, one might argue, means that the political
process cannot be trusted to prevent excessive taxa-
tion.52
On closer inspection, though, that distinction
seems incapable of carrying much weight. First, it
founders on its own factual premise. The parties
most palpably disadvantaged in United Haulers
were probably not the residents of Oneida and
Herkimer counties but instead the out-of-state
waste processors that the ordinances deprived of
customers.53 Indeed, the very reason the plaintiffs
brought suit is that, absent the ordinances, the
haulers would have delivered the waste to lower-
cost, out-of-state processors. Second, and more fun-
damentally, drawing such a distinction between
Davis and United Haulers would spawn a doctrine
that would likely be judicially unmanageable. Every
regulation favoring a government entity in an activ-
ity involving interstate commerce will impose costs
on out-of-state interests. Thus, differentiating state
or local laws based on their cost exportation would
always be a matter of degree. As a result, the Court
would be forced to devise some standard for what
level of cost exportation was ‘‘too much’’ and, in the
application of that standard, to answer a host of
complicated empirical questions concerning the rel-
evant externalities.54 Worse still, the Court might be
required to determine when out-of-state interests
forced to bear those costs nonetheless had ‘‘suffi-
cient’’ representation in the political process that the
results of that process could be trusted. Whatever
the merits of that approach in theory, it seems
unworkable in practice.
Alternatively, one might argue that United
Haulers differs from Davis in terms of the nature of
the competitors disadvantaged by the challenged
laws. Specifically, while the flow control ordinances
favored local government at the expense of private
businesses, tax preferences for in-state municipal
bonds favor one government at the expense of other
governments. In other words, the preference in
Davis is for a public entity engaged in public versus
public competition rather than public versus private
competition. One could therefore argue that, while
51United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1797.
52For an excellent articulation of this argument, see Yale
and Galle, ‘‘Muni Bonds and the Commerce Clause After
United Haulers,’’ State Tax Notes, June 18, 2007, p. 877, Doc
2007-14387, or 2007 STT 118-4.
53See id. at 1044 (‘‘The Court’s assertion inUnited Haulers
that the added costs of trash removal are the ‘most palpable’
harm of the Oneida-Herkimer ordinance is dubious’’).
54Those were precisely the reasons the Court rejected the
taxpayers’ challenge to Montana’s coal severance tax in
Commonwealth Edison v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981),
discussed in greater detail infra.
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the relevant competitors were not ‘‘similarly situ-
ated’’ in United Haulers, they are in Davis, such
that their unequal treatment by Kentucky more
clearly resembles economic protectionism.55
No doubt, the costs of tax exemptions like Ken-
tucky’s are principally (though not exclusively) felt
by out-of-state governments.56 But it is unclear why
that should matter under United Haulers. Nothing
in United Haulers suggests that, had some of the
waste processors that lost business because of the
flow control ordinances been publicly owned, the
result would have been different. Indeed, the ration-
ale behind the Court’s statement in United Haulers
that government and private business are not simi-
larly situated was that, ‘‘unlike private enterprise,
government is vested with the responsibility of pro-
tecting the health, safety, and welfare of its citi-
zens.’’57 That sentence makes sense in reference to
the governments of Oneida and Herkimer counties,
the entities responsible for protecting the health,
safety, and welfare of the communities that had
enacted the ordinances. It makes much less sense in
reference to ‘‘government’’ more generally. Out-of-
state governments are no more responsible for the
health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of Oneida
and Herkimer counties than is private enterprise. In
that respect, out-of-state governments are no differ-
ent than private businesses under the logic of
United Haulers. Neither is similarly situated to the
government that has enacted a law favoring itself in
the performance of a traditional government activity
on behalf of its citizens.
Of course, one might take issue with United
Haulers. That is, one could argue that allowing state
and local governments to enact legislation that pro-
tects their own economic interests in the perfor-
mance of various activities — such as the disposal of
waste or the sale of municipal bonds — will cause
more harm to the national economy than is justified
by the benefits of enhanced state autonomy. But
unless the Court wants to reconsider a decision it
handed down only six months ago, that is water
under the bridge. If we take United Haulers seri-
ously, the outcome in Davis should be clear: Tax
exemptions like Kentucky’s do not discriminate
against interstate commerce for purposes of the
dormant commerce clause.
And establishing that those tax preferences are
nondiscriminatory should be all that is necessary to
establish their constitutionality. Since 1977 the Su-
preme Court has typically applied the four-part test
from Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady58 to deter-
mine whether a state tax provision is consistent
with the dormant commerce clause.59 Under Com-
plete Auto, a state tax is permissible so long as it ‘‘is
applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with
the taxing state, is fairly apportioned, does not
discriminate against interstate commerce, and is
fairly related to the services provided.’’60 In Davis,
there is no plausible claim that Kentucky lacks a
sufficient nexus with the values it seeks to tax, that
its tax is unfairly apportioned, or that it is not fairly
related to the services it provided. The only possible
dormant commerce clause argument — and, indeed,
the only one posited by the Davises61 — is that
exemptions like Kentucky’s discriminate against
interstate commerce. Thus, if Kentucky’s tax prefer-
ence is indeed nondiscriminatory, it should satisfy
Complete Auto and thus be constitutional.62
III. Practical Consequences and Institutional
Competence
United Haulers provides a solid legal basis for the
Court to hold that state income tax preferences for
their own municipal bonds do not violate the dor-
mant commerce clause. But cases that reach the
Supreme Court are rarely about doctrinal niceties
alone. Davis is no exception. Indeed, the most inter-
esting aspects of Davis involve its practical conse-
quences and the comparative institutional compe-
tencies of Congress and the Court. And ultimately it
is those considerations that provide the most com-
pelling justification for siding with Kentucky.
The nub of the case is this: A decision to invalidate
Kentucky’s tax scheme would impose billions of
dollars in transition costs on state treasuries.63 And
the reason the states would incur those losses is that
55Again, Yale and Galle make this argument nicely. See
Yale and Galle, supra note 52.
56Not exclusively because there is certainly some competi-
tion for capital between state and local governments and the
private issuers of debt (and, indeed, other types of securities).
See id. at 1043.
57United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1795.
58430 U.S. 274 (1977).
59See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc.,
514 U.S. 175, 183 (1995); Itel Containers Int’l Corp. v. Hud-
dleston, 507 U.S. 60, 73 (1993); Trinova Corp. v. Michigan
Dept. of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 372 (1991);Goldberg v. Sweet,
488 U.S. 252, 257-60 (1989).
60Complete Auto, 430 U.S., at 279.
61And that, in fact, is the only dormant commerce clause
claim the Davises have made.
62More specifically, if Kentucky’s tax preference does not
discriminate against interstate commerce, it should not also
have to pass the so-called Pike balancing test, which asks
whether the state law at issue imposes costs that are ‘‘clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.’’ Pike v.
Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). The Court appears to
have treated the other three prongs of the Complete Auto test
as the Pike standard translated into the context of state and
local taxation, as the Court has never actually applied the
Pike test to a state or local tax scheme. See Galle and Yale,
supra note 32.
63See Joel Michael, ‘‘Kentucky v. Davis: Implications for
State Tax Policy and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine,’’
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the Supreme Court’s judgment would apply retroac-
tively. Because the states had every reason to be-
lieve that those exemptions were constitutional,
they structured their fiscal affairs accordingly, mak-
ing large financial commitments to their taxpayers
and bondholders. A decision in Davis declaring those
exemptions impermissible would therefore catch the
states over a barrel, forcing them to pay hundreds of
millions of dollars in tax refunds and to forgo many
billions of dollars in tax revenue on municipal bonds
that have already been issued. Setting aside what
the Court’s ruling might mean for the states going
forward— that is, for the tax treatment of municipal
bonds that have not yet been issued — it clearly
would require state governments to absorb huge
financial losses solely because of commitments they
had made when they reasonably believed those
preferences were constitutional.
Congress, however, could avoid those transition
costs. It could develop a prospective remedy that
applied exclusively to municipal bonds that have not
yet been issued. Thus, even if the justices are
convinced that interstate commerce would benefit
from the states’ equal taxation of in-state and out-
of-state municipal bonds, the Court would be well
advised to stay its hand and ratify the status quo.
Congress is in a far better position to craft an
equitable transition to such a regime.
A. The Stakes for the States
American state and local governments have im-
posed various forms of personal income taxes since
the Colonial period.64 Wisconsin enacted the first
modern personal income tax in 1911, and several
other states quickly followed suit.65 From their in-
ception, those state income tax codes have exempted
the interest earned on municipal bonds issued by
the taxing state or one of its political subdivisions
and they have denied that benefit to the interest
earned on bonds issued by their sister states. For
instance, Massachusetts adopted that preference in
1918, New York in 1919, North Carolina in 1921,
and Virginia in 1926.66 Moreover, Congress has been
aware of those tax preferences for several decades,
and it has taken no action to limit or prohibit
them.67 Today, 42 states offer some form of tax
preference for the interest earned on in-state mu-
nicipal bonds.68 And until the Kentucky Court of
Appeals handed down its decision in Davis, no court
in the United States, state or federal, had held that
the differential tax treatment of in-state and out-of-
state municipal bonds was unconstitutional.69
Given that history, state governments have struc-
tured their financial affairs around the assumption
that providing a tax preference for the interest
earned on in-state municipal bonds is constitutional.
Those commitments mean that, were the Supreme
Court to invalidate Kentucky’s tax scheme in Davis,
the states would be forced to endure some signifi-
cant financial dislocations.
To appreciate what is at stake for state govern-
ments, it is useful to isolate the implications of
Davis for two distinct (but overlapping) groups of
taxpayers. The first group is taxpayers who have
recently paid state income tax on interest earned on
out-of-state municipal bonds. The second and far
more significant group is taxpayers who now own
out-of-state municipal bonds. Regarding the first
group, a decision to invalidate state tax preferences
for their own municipal bonds would require the
states to disgorge hundreds of millions of dollars in
tax refunds. Regarding the second group, it would
effectively force the states to forgo many billions of
dollars in income tax revenue well into the future.
1. Taxpayers who have recently paid taxes
on interest earned on out-of-state municipal
bonds
As a threshold matter, it is clear that a ruling in
Davis that invalidated tax exemptions like Ken-
tucky’s would apply retroactively. Granted, the
Court’s precedent has ‘‘left unresolved the precise
extent to which the presumptively retroactive effect
of this Court’s decisions may be altered in civil
cases.’’70 But the Court held in Harper v. Virginia
Dept. of Taxation71 that ‘‘when this Court applies a
rule of federal law to the parties before it, that
rule . . . must be given full retroactive effect in all
cases still open on direct review and as to all events,
regardless of whether such events predate or post-
date our announcement of the rule.’’72 Thus, unless
the Court actually withheld relief from the Davises
themselves, a decision invalidating Kentucky’s tax
State Tax Notes, Sept. 17, 2007, p. 753, Doc 2007- 18392, or
2007 STT 181-2 (discussing the near-term fiscal ramifications
for the states).
64See Jerome Hellerstein and Walter Hellerstein, State
Taxation, para. 20.01 (2007).
65See id.
661918 Mass. Acts 7; 1919 N.Y. Laws 1641-42; 1921 N.C.
Sess. Laws 208; 1926 Va. Acts 961.
67See Brief of National Association of State Treasurers,
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 15-17, DOR v.
Davis (No. 06-666).
68Alaska, Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, Washing-
ton, and Wyoming impose no taxes on personal income,
Hellerstein and Hellerstein, supra note 64, at para. 20.01 n. 5,
while Indiana does not distinguish in-state from out-of-state
municipal bonds, see Ind. Code Ann. section 6-3-1-3.5.
69See Hellerstein and Hellerstein, supra note 64, at para.
4.13.
70Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 96
(1993).
71Id. 509 U.S. 86 (1993).
72Id. at 97.
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exemption would immediately apply retroactively to
all similarly situated taxpayers nationwide.
Further, the due process clause would require
that retroactive remedy to ‘‘provide meaningful
backward-looking relief to rectify any unconstitu-
tional deprivation.’’73 In a case like Davis, in which
the claim is that the state’s tax scheme discrimi-
nates against interstate commerce, that relief could
take three forms, any of which would remedy the
constitutional problem:
• the states could refund all taxes paid on any
interest earned on out-of-state municipal
bonds;
• the states could retroactively impose a tax on
any interest earned on in-state municipal
bonds; or
• the states could enact some combination of the
two that resulted in the equal tax treatment of
all municipal bond interest during the relevant
time period.74
Although each of those options might be open in
theory, reality is a different matter. As Walter
Hellerstein and Dan Coenen have recognized, ‘‘in
the real world, . . . the practical and political diffi-
culties of fashioning any retroactive remedy other
than a refund (as well as legal difficulties presented
by federal and state strictures regarding retroactive
legislation) make solutions that require back-tax
collections unlikely.’’75 Thus, the states would effec-
tively be required to award refunds to every tax-
payer who had paid income tax on interest earned on
out-of-state municipal bonds within the relevant
limitations period. And that would be a substantial
liability. For instance, in 2003, New York residents
reported $636.4 million of interest income from
out-of-state municipal bonds.76 New York’s esti-
mated tax revenue from this interest was $45.8
million.77 For Connecticut, the estimated income tax
revenue in 2004 from out-of-state municipal bond
interest and the dividends paid by municipal bond
mutual funds was $70.9 million.78 Thus, the imme-
diate tax refund liability for the states as a whole
would run well into the hundreds of millions — and
probably several billions — of dollars.
2. The tax treatment of outstanding
municipal bonds
While substantial, the states’ immediate liability
for tax refunds would be small compared with the
fiscal consequences related to the taxation of the
interest yet to be earned on outstanding out-of-state
municipal bonds. Again, a decision invalidating
Kentucky’s tax exemption would require the states
to treat all municipal bonds equally. For the interest
earned on municipal bonds that have already been
issued, the states would have two choices in provid-
ing an adequate remedy: They could tax the interest
earned on in-state municipal bonds or they could
exempt the interest earned on out-of-state munici-
pal bonds.
To treat in-state and out-of-state
municipal bonds equally, most
states would be forced to abstain
from taxing the interest earned by
their taxpayers on any outstanding
out-of-state municipal bonds.
For most states, the option of taxing the interest
earned on in-state municipal bonds that investors
have already purchased would be impracticable, if
not legally foreclosed. In-state investors have pur-
chased those bonds in reliance on their favorable
state tax treatment. For most in-state investors, the
state tax exemption is a critical aspect of the trans-
action: They have accepted a lower yield in exchange
for the state income tax benefit, such that they still
receive a competitive after-tax rate of return on
their investment. Thus, taxing the interest on in-
state municipal bonds that taxpayers have already
acquired would be highly inequitable. It would
change the rules on the bondholders midstream,
forcing them to accept an after-tax rate of return
well below that of comparable investments. More-
over, several state constitutions prohibit the taxa-
tion of municipal bond interest, and in other states
the tax exemption is contractually guaranteed.
That means that, to treat in-state and out-of-state
municipal bonds equally, most states would be
forced to abstain from taxing the interest earned by
their taxpayers on any outstanding out-of-state mu-
nicipal bonds. The fiscal repercussions of such a
mandate would be substantial. As discussed above,
the revenue loss for the states for a single year
would run well into the hundreds of millions of
dollars.79 Given that many outstanding bonds will
not mature for another 30 or 40 years, holding those
73McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages &
Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 31 (1990).
74See id. at 40-1.
75Walter Hellerstein and Dan T. Coenen, ‘‘Commerce
Clause Restraints on State Business Development Incen-
tives,’’ 81 Cornell L. Rev. 789, 873 (1996).
76Dwight Denison, Merl Hackbar, and Michael Moody,
‘‘Davis v. DOR of Kentucky: A Preliminary Impact Assess-
ment,’’ IFIR Working Paper 2007-03 (2007), at pp. 13-14,
available at http://www.ifigr.org/publication/ifir_working_
papers/IFIR-WP-2007- 03.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2007).
77Id. at 14.
78Id. 79See id. at 13-14.
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tax preferences unconstitutional would cost state
governments many billions of dollars in forgone tax
revenue.
Perhaps those consequences would be less disqui-
eting had the states persisted in imposing income
taxes that they had reason to believe were unconsti-
tutional.80 But that is not the case here. Before
January 2006, state governments had little reason
to believe that those tax exemptions were constitu-
tionally suspect, and they acted accordingly.81 Forc-
ing the states to shoulder those transition costs,
despite their reasonable and substantial reliance on
extant understandings of the dormant commerce
clause, seems inappropriate under the circum-
stances.
B. The Institutional Competencies of
Congress and the Court
Again, all of the aforementioned fiscal conse-
quences would be transition costs — costs attribut-
able to the states’ obligation to honor commitments
that they had made when they reasonably believed
that their tax exemptions were constitutional. Thus,
they are costs that would disappear if the mandate
to tax all municipal bonds equally applied only
prospectively to bonds that had not yet been issued.
Again, the Supreme Court could not issue such a
mandate. But Congress clearly could.
As the Court has recognized on several occasions,
Congress ‘‘unquestionably’’ has the authority under
the commerce clause to regulate the states’ taxation
of interstate commerce.82 And Congress has invoked
that authority on numerous occasions to protect
interstate commerce from various burdens it has
deemed inconsistent with the national interest.83
Thus, if Congress concluded that state tax prefer-
ences for in-state municipal bonds unduly interfered
with interstate commerce, it could enact legislation
limiting or prohibiting them. And that legislation
could ensure that the mandate of equal taxation
applied only to municipal bonds to be issued in the
future. States would not be required to pay refunds,
and they could tax outstanding municipal bonds
under the rules that existed at the time of their
issuance. The transition costs would disappear.
At this point, one might argue that those practical
consequences, as well as the comparative institu-
tional competencies of Congress and the Court, are
not matters that the Court should consider in adju-
dicating questions of constitutional law. The Court
should simply interpret the traditional sources of
constitutional law— the text, structure, history, and
precedent — and let the chips fall where they may.
For the Court to entertain various policy consider-
ations would be to venture beyond the proper judi-
cial role. It would amount to the sort of political,
results-oriented decision-making that is reserved to
the elected branches.
I have two responses. First, as an empirical
matter, that conception of Supreme Court decision-
making is highly unrealistic (to put it politely).
Constitutional law, especially in cases that reach the
Court, rarely yields clear answers. That indetermi-
nacy means that the justices’ views about public
policy will inevitably affect their decisions. Even if
the justices do not consciously pursue their policy
preferences in their votes and opinions, we know
that all human beings, no matter their intentions,
are quite motivated reasoners. The human animal is
incredibly adept at convincing himself that purely
objective analysis leads to results that he otherwise
finds pleasing. Thus, the justices’ policy views nec-
essarily influence their attraction to particular con-
stitutional theories, frame their readings of lan-
guage and history, and shade their interpretations of
precedent. No matter how consciously committed
the justices are to interpreting the law (and doing
nothing more), policy considerations will always
influence the Court’s decisions.
Second, setting that point aside, the Court’s own
precedent has endorsed a tradition of judicial defer-
ence to Congress’s superintendence of interstate
commerce in cases raising similar issues of institu-
tional competence, particularly when they involve
80Cf. McKesson, 496 U.S. at 49-50 (discussing Florida’s
continued imposition of a liquor tax that was blatantly
protectionist and only cosmetically different from one the
Court had previously invalidated).
81The one possible exception is Minnesota, where some
state officials in 1995 discussed the possibility that the state’s
tax preference for Minnesota municipal bonds would be
declared unconstitutional. See Brief for Respondents at 47-8,
DOR v. Davis (No. 06-666).
82Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Harrison, 520 U.S.
564, 572 (1997). See also Quill, 504 U.S. 298, 318 (1992);
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 280 (1978); Pruden-
tial Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 434 (1946). (For the
decision in Camps Newfound/Owatonna, see Doc 97-13082 or
97 STN 99-36.)
83See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 86-172, 73 Stat. 55, codified at 15
U.S.C. section 381 (prohibiting the states from imposing
income taxes on businesses that keep their contacts within
the taxing state beneath a specific threshold); Internet Tax
Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 108-435, 118 Stat. 2615 (2004)
(prohibiting states from imposing taxes on Internet access or
‘‘discriminatory taxes on electronic commerce’’); Pub. L. No.
104-95, 109 Stat. 979, codified at 4 U.S.C. section 114 (re-
stricting the states’ authority to tax the retirement income of
nonresidents); Soldier and Sailors Civil Relief Act of 1940, Act
of Oct. 17, 1940, ch. 888, section 514, codified at 50 App.
U.S.C. section 571 (limiting the states’ power to tax the
property and personal income of military personnel); Railroad
Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (the 4-R
Act), Pub. L. No. 94-210, 90 Stat. 54, codified at 49 U.S.C.
section 11501 (prohibiting states from imposing higher taxes
on railroad property than on other commercial or industrial
property).
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matters of state and local taxation. Consider Moor-
manMfg. Co. v. Bair, which addressed Iowa’s single-
sales-factor formula for apportioning the income of
interstate businesses. The plaintiff demonstrated
that Iowa’s method of apportionment likely sub-
jected many out-of-state taxpayers to multiple taxa-
tion, and thus disadvantaged interstate commerce
relative to purely intrastate commerce.84 But the
Court reasoned that it was ill-suited to resolve the
controversy, because doing so would have effectively
required the Court to choose a particular method of
apportioning income under the guise of interpreting
the dormant commerce clause.85 ‘‘It is clear that the
legislative power granted to Congress by the com-
merce clause of the Constitution would amply justify
the enactment of legislation requiring all States to
adhere to uniform rules for the division of income. It
is to that body, and not this Court, that the Consti-
tution has committed such policy decisions.’’86
Even if interstate commerce would
benefit from the states’ equal
taxation of in-state and out-of-state
municipal bonds, Congress is the
only institution capable of devising
an equitable transition to such a
system.
Or consider Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Mon-
tana, which involved a severance tax that Montana
imposed on all coal mined in the state. Because the
rate of the tax was extremely high, and because its
economic incidence fell predominantly on out-of-
state electricity consumers, the plaintiffs asserted
that Montana had effectively exported its tax bur-
den to other states, a core concern of the dormant
commerce clause.87 Indeed, Justice Byron White
conceded in his concurrence that the case was ‘‘very
troublesome.’’88 But because a holding in favor of the
taxpayers would have forced the Court to make a
range of difficult empirical economic judgments, it
upheld the state’s tax scheme and left the policy
questions to Congress: ‘‘Under our federal system,
the determination is to be made by state legislatures
in the first instance and, if necessary, by Congress,
when particular state taxes are thought to be con-
trary to federal interests.’’89
Perhaps the most analogous case is Quill Corp. v.
North Dakota, which addressed whether a state
could require an out-of- state vendor to collect use
taxes on sales to the taxing state’s consumers, even
when the vendor had no physical presence in the
taxing state. The Court had invalidated an identical
collection obligation 25 years earlier in National
Bellas Hess, Inc. v. DOR of Ill.,90 and an entire
industry had grown up in reliance on Bellas Hess’s
bright-line, ‘‘physical presence’’ requirement.91 De-
spite some evident ambivalence — the Court con-
ceded that the physical presence requirement ‘‘ap-
pears artificial at its edges,’’ and that it had rejected
a ‘‘similar bright-line, physical-presence require-
ment’’ in other state tax cases92 — the Court reaf-
firmed the rule of Bellas Hess. Although there were
problems with Bellas Hess, Congress was in the best
position to alter the status quo.93 ‘‘The underlying
issue is not only one that Congress may be better
qualified to resolve, but also one that Congress has
the ultimate power to resolve. No matter how we
evaluate the burdens that use taxes impose on
interstate commerce, Congress remains free to dis-
agree with our conclusions.’’94
Moorman, Commonwealth Edison, and Quill to-
gether represent an important, pragmatic strand of
the SupremeCourt’s dormant commerce clause juris-
prudence. They show that even when state tax
schemes arguably burden interstate commerce, the
Court’s disruption of the status quo may not be the
wisest course. For reasons of institutional compe-
tence, the Court is better off in some instances
leaving the matter to Congress.
In my opinion, Davis is just such a case. Even if
interstate commerce would benefit from the states’
equal taxation of in-state and out-of-state municipal
bonds, Congress is the only institution capable of
devising an equitable transition to such a system. A
judicial decree mandating that equality would im-
pose costs that are too high — and too unfair to state
governments — to justify such a holding.
Conclusion
In the concluding paragraph of his opinion for the
Court in Quill, Justice John Paul Stevens offered
the following insight:
Even if we were convinced that Bellas Hesswas
inconsistent with our commerce clause juris-
prudence, this very fact might give us pause
and counsel withholding our hand, at least for
now. Congress has the power to protect inter-
state commerce from intolerable or even unde-
sirable burdens. In this situation, it may be
84Moorman Mnfg., 437 U.S. at 276-77.
85Id. at 278-80.
86Id. at 280.
87Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S. at 617-18.
88Id. at 637 (Justice White, concurring).
89Id. at 628.
90386 U.S. 753 (1967).
91See Quill, 504 U.S., at 316.
92See id. at 315, 317.
93See id. at 317-18.
94Id. at 318 (footnote omitted).
Special Report
278 State Tax Notes, October 22, 2007
(C) Tax Analysts 2007. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.
that the better part of both wisdom and valor is
to respect the judgment of the other branches
of the Government.95
The same is true in Davis. Given what is at stake
for the states, the Court would be wise to stay its
hand and ratify the status quo. For even if state tax
preferences for their own municipal bonds are in-
deed a drag on the national economy, Congress is
much better suited than the Court to solve the
problem. ✰
95Id. at 318-19 (internal quotation marks, alterations, and
citations omitted).
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